The Western Balkans
October 2026 in the Balkans was characterised by the phrase “foreign hands”. In Tirana, Prime Minister Edi Rama blamed them for the biggest protests against his government in years.1 In Podgorica, police identified a “foreign hand” when they detained and expelled the founder of the Russian propaganda network Rybar.2 In Skopje, a popular talk show explained Bulgaria’s veto as the work of “old KGB structures”.3
All three stories centre on the EU. The Commission proposed safeguards for new members that could last up to 15 years after they join,4 while during the summit on 15 October, EU leaders failed to agree on a target date for Montenegro, the most advanced candidate.5
1. Student protests and the Criminal Procedure Code: Tirana
The biggest challenge to Edi Rama in years started with a fence on the coast. On 23 May, residents of Zvërnec, near Vlorë, protested when protected coastline was closed off for the construction of a luxury resort linked to the investment network of Jared Kushner, son-in-law of US President Donald Trump. From this local protest grew the Flamingo movement, which has no leaders and no party.6 However, the movement has also been fuelled by perceived corruption allegations, such as when, in March, parliament refused the anti-corruption prosecution SPAK’s request to arrest former Deputy Prime Minister Belinda Balluku.7 This view was further strengthened when, on 1 October, prosecutors warned that a government plan to change 105 articles of the Criminal Procedure Code would weaken investigations.8
On 13 October, a student protest in front of the Ministry of Education turned into a national movement. Albanian students have done this before. In December 2018, protests over education costs forced Rama to dismiss eight ministers.9 This time the protests were violent. On the second night, protesters set fire to the Education Ministry,10 and on 17 October police fired rubber bullets.11 By 18 October, 272 people had been injured, among them 169 police officers.12 Rama refused to resign and publicly called on the citizens of Albania to consider whether they wish to see violent protests or EU membership.13
Interestingly, the government has switched the blame for the protests several times in the past. In June the government pointed at Iran, and in July at the Kremlin.14 In October Rama spoke of “foreign hands”,1 while also alleging an attempted drone attack on his office,15 although he publicly produced no evidence of the attack. He later admitted that this “hybrid war” was more effective, because the problems behind it, such as living costs and expensive housing, are real.16
Albania’s protests happened during a wave of youth and cost-of-living protests that began with school blockades in France in late September and continued in October in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Belgium.17 Young people in these countries share the same worries and copy each other’s methods through social media. Mimicking methods does not prove a conspiracy, but it does open the door for such an explanation to be used by governments. It would appear that Prime Minister Rama decided to go down this path, and attempted to stop the protests with repressive methods that have previously been considered politically unacceptable.
On 25 October police again used tear gas, water cannons and rubber bullets in Tirana,18 and on 29 October opposition MPs set off flares inside parliament.19 So far, it appears that the Albanian government is using the fear of this “hybrid war” to justify repressing protests, although the possibility remains that the protests, as well as the alleged drone attack, were indeed organised by a foreign power.
2. Expulsion of Rybar’s founder and stalled constitutional changes: Podgorica
On the morning of 9 October, Montenegrin police detained Mikhail Zvinchuk, the founder of the Russian pro-war Telegram channel Rybar, together with his wife and three associates in the town of Risan. All five were expelled from the country. Zvinchuk is under EU and UK sanctions, and the United States offered a reward of up to 10 million dollars for information on Rybar’s staff.2 Prime Minister Milojko Spajić said the arrest followed warnings of attempts to destabilise the country.20
The authorities justified the expulsion on national security grounds.20 Additionally, Montenegro also managed to close a door to further Russian influence. From 1 November, citizens of Russia, Belarus, China, Saudi Arabia and Turkey need a visa to enter the country, in line with EU rules.21
The bigger risk to Montenegro’s EU path comes from inside its own parliament. On 27 August, Speaker Andrija Mandić announced that he had offered his condolences to the son of Ratko Mladić, who was convicted of genocide in Srebrenica. The opposition then refused to support the constitutional changes Montenegro needs for its EU talks until parliament voted on his removal. On 13 October, in a secret ballot, 37 MPs voted to dismiss Mandić and 41 voted against.22 According to the daily newspaper Vijesti, the 13th was also the deadline for starting the constitutional changes on integrity checks that Montenegro needs to close Chapter 23 this year.22 In September, an attempt to start them won only 46 of the 54 votes needed.23
There is also pressure from the neighbours. Croatia called Mandić’s condolences unacceptable and said they would not help Montenegro’s EU bid.24 At the EU summit on 15 October, Zagreb successfully lobbied to remove the end-of-2026 target date for Montenegro to complete its accession negotiations.5 Commissioner Marta Kos said that no progress is possible without Croatian consent.25 One of the open issues is the Jadran, a training sailing ship that now belongs to the Montenegrin navy. Croatia argues that the ship was in Tivat only for maintenance when Yugoslavia broke up, demands its return, and has said it will not support Montenegro’s accession until all open issues are resolved.26 From Belgrade came a different signal. Montenegro asked Serbia once more to extradite Svetozar Marović, a convicted former president of Serbia and Montenegro, only days before the deadline enforcing his prison sentence expired on 10 October.27
Montenegro has closed 21 of 33 chapters,28 which German Chancellor Friedrich Merz praised as almost complete.29
3. The Bulgarian veto and new tensions: Skopje
In October, the dispute between North Macedonia and Bulgaria was exacerbated by the remains of a medieval tsar and a car crash. However, these are merely symptoms of a much older problem. North Macedonia’s EU path is frozen because its government refuses to add a Bulgarian minority to the constitution, as agreed in 2022, without guarantees from the EU that this would be the final condition for its accession.30
At the start of October there was a small hope. During her regional tour, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said in Skopje that a first step towards unblocking had been agreed.31 It did not last. On 3 October, Greece handed Bulgaria the remains believed to be those of Tsar Samuel, a ruler whom both Bulgaria and North Macedonia see as part of their own history.32 Bulgarian President Iliana Iotova then said that before any talks take place on the issue of the remains, the case of Iva Mihajlova must be solved first.31 Mihajlova, who holds both citizenships, had been banned from leaving Kočani after causing a fatal car crash in October 2025. By 12 October, she was in Bulgaria, and even President Iotova said she did not know how she had left.33 Skopje saw both events as provocations, and Sofia had linked one of them directly to the EU talks. In late October, Prime Minister Hristijan Mickoski accused Sofia of using EU mechanisms to slow North Macedonia down.34
The Macedonian media went further. In the talk show “Teški muabeti” on 15 October, the hosts called Bulgarian citizens “normal, cultured and deceived” and blamed politicians such as Rumen Radev, Krasimir Karakachanov and Angel Dzhambazki. They linked Radev to “old KGB structures” working for “Russian kopecks”.3 Here it is the media, not the government, that present a dispute about identity, language and history as a security threat and as a question of Russian influence. For a Macedonian audience, this framing is comforting, because it turns a difficult question about history and compromise into a story about a foreign influence.
The situation was further complicated when, at the same EU summit on 15 October, at the same EU summit where Montenegro lost its target date, Bulgarian Prime Minister Rumen Radev broke ranks with the other EU leaders and backed a diesel deal between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin that defied Western sanctions. He said that Europe’s real problem is high fuel prices and that he does not support strikes against refineries. Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson, by contrast, warned that the deal helps Russia finance its war.35 The same evening, several hundred people protested in central Sofia and demanded the resignation of Radev and President Iotova. They accused both leaders of pro-Kremlin policies and of refusing to say that Russia was behind recent drone attacks on merchant ships in Bulgaria’s economic zone in the Black Sea. A similar protest followed on 20 October.36 This does not confirm the claims about KGB structures, but it shows that criticism of Radev’s position on Russia also comes from some members of the Bulgarian public.
However, the potential Russian influence does not explain the Bulgarian veto of Macedonian EU accession. Bulgaria first began using its veto in 2020 under the pro-Western government of Boyko Borissov, while Bulgarian society was divided over it. In 2022, another pro-Western prime minister, Kiril Petkov, blamed Russian spies for deepening the dispute.37 However, the veto remained.
Regardless of whether Russia is actively involved in the dispute, it gains benefits from it as it takes up a significant amount of EU attention, while also straining relations within NATO. The uncomfortable reality facing Skopje is that, with the combination of Rumen Radev’s government and Iotova beginning a new five-year presidential term, EU membership within five years is out of reach. Blaming Moscow may explain part of the story, but it does not change the rules in the EU, where Bulgaria still has a veto. The dispute can only be solved when both sides treat it again as a political question about history and the constitution, one that must be resolved through negotiations.
* Views and opinions of the authors of this paper do not necessarily correspond to the views of the Euro-Atlantic Council of Slovenia.
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