Ethiopia, Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Sahel
In October, numerous conflicts across Africa intensified. Ethiopia and Eritrea found themselves in a military confrontation along their border, while rebel groups within Ethiopia itself tied down significant government forces. Fighting in Sudan continued, with both sides making extensive use of unmanned aerial vehicles, while the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) intensified airstrikes against the Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF) rear areas. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, rebel organisations joined forces with the political opposition to the current government, while South and North Kivu remained the scene of intense fighting between M23 and government forces. In the Sahel, meanwhile, rivalry between JNIM and ISSP continued to intensify.
1. Ethiopia
Rebel groups that allied against the central government in September, including Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), Fano militia, and Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), continued fighting in October. In Oromia, for example, reports emerged of an OLA attack on a sugar factory in the Sulula Finchaa district on 19th of October. Fighting between the rebels and security forces spread to several villages in the surrounding area, while casualties on both sides remain unclear. Some sources even report up to 100 deaths among security forces.[1]
The most significant developments, however, took place in the Tigray region, where federal government forces continued their advance and managed to capture Mekelle by the 4th of October, followed by the remaining key towns in the region by October 12th. The rebels were forced to retreat into rural areas.[2] With this advance, Ethiopian forces also reached the Ethiopian-Eritrean border. Units of the Tigray Defence Forces, the military wing of the TPLF (TDF), together with the Eritrean armed forces, which were reportedly supporting the rebels on the Ethiopian side of the border, withdrew to new defensive positions, which largely followed the state border. Sources report sporadic exchanges of fire between the Ethiopian and Eritrean armies in several border areas of Tigray.[3] Both sides accused each other of aggression and reportedly considered themselves to be in a state of war.3 TDF units launched a counteroffensive in central Tigray between 12 and 15 October and recaptured several settlements, including Abiy Addi on the 14th.[4] In response to the TDF counteroffensive, Ethiopian government forces and their allies largely withdrew further into the region and abandoned their confrontation with Eritrean forces. After 20 October, they launched a counterattack of their own and recaptured Abiy Addi in the following days. This, together with attempts to establish the central Ethiopian government’s authority in the region, indicates that Addis Ababa is probably currently prioritising the suppression of the insurgencies within Ethiopia itself and, despite its military superiority, does not plan any major offensives against Eritrea. Government forces are continuing offensive operations, as confirmed by reports that they recaptured numerous rural areas in the central part of the region on 28 October.[5]
2. Sudan
One of the main hotspots of the conflict in Sudan remains North Kordofan, where RSF units halted further SAF advances during the first half of the month. They also continued shelling important towns with drones, particularly El Obeid, most likely to increase pressure on the enemy and prevent further offensives.[6] In response to the escalation of RSF attacks, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) increased the frequency of airstrikes in the western part of the country, which serves as an RSF rear area. In East Darfur, for example, they bombed oil facilities and attacked transport infrastructure, while the town of Babanusa in West Kordofan was also targeted. The SAF’s objective was reportedly to destroy the logistical support and defensive capabilities of enemy forces and resume offensive operations in Kordofan.[7]
In addition to the fighting in Kordofan, the Blue Nile remained the second major hotspot of the conflict. At the beginning of the month, the alliance between the RSF and the rebel group SPLM-N continued its offensive towards Ed Damazin, the capital of the state. According to their own statements, their units reportedly reached Al-Kadalou on the 4th of October, approximately 50 kilometres from the capital.[8] In the second half of the month, however, the initiative appears to have shifted to the SAF. Sources within the SAF reported successful defensive operations[9] and a counterattack[10] around 20 October. At the same time, drone attacks in the region have been intensifying for some time, reaching a new peak towards the end of the month. On the 29th of October, reports emerged of attacks on gold mines, a fuel tanker and other energy facilities, as well as public institutions such as a school and a health centre. According to local authorities, the RSF are most likely responsible for the attacks. The attacks on gold mines may suggest that the RSF are attempting to weaken the adversary’s economic power. Numerous individuals and companies linked to either side have already been subjected to economic sanctions imposed by both the EU and the United Kingdom for some time.[11]
3. Democratic Republic of the Congo
In October, an important political and security manoeuvre took place in the Democratic Republic of the Congo when former president Joseph Kabila presented a new military-political coalition on 12 October, named the Front pour la Refondation de la Nation (FRN). The armed group M23, which controls extensive territories in the eastern part of the country, is notably included in the coalition. In addition to Kabila, the coalition’s leadership also includes Corneille Nangaa, former leader of the Congo River Alliance, as well as other prominent figures from various rebel organisations and M23 itself. According to Claude Ibalanky, a coalition adviser, the coalition’s goal is to “end tyranny at all costs”. He further added that they are prepared to use force to achieve success. For the country’s government and its army, these developments mean that they will have to face a stronger enemy than before, one that will act in a more unified manner on the political stage. This could significantly affect the intensity of the fighting and make governing the country more difficult.[12]
The main hotspots of fighting remain the provinces of North and South Kivu, where M23, with the assistance of its allies, has long been fighting against the national army and the Wazalendo organisation, which is associated with it. These allies enjoy the support of the Rwandan army. During the first part of October, government forces and their allies launched an offensive, primarily in the northern part of the territory controlled by M23. They recaptured the town of Remeka, which M23 had seized at the end of September, and launched attacks in the Lubero region. Fighting also took place along sections of the front line where no major offensives were underway, as the fighting is relatively decentralised.[13] Between 7 and 21 October, no major clashes occurred in the northernmost part of the front, while the local hotspot shifted to the higher-altitude areas of Walungu district in South Kivu province, where concentrated fighting lasted for two weeks.[14] After 21 October, the fighting did not stop, but neither side achieved any confirmed significant gains. In addition to the clashes in Walungu, fighting also intensified around Rugezi and in the Minembwe highlands, reaching its peak in the final part of the month. The outcome of these clashes remains unknown. On 28 October, Rwanda, or more specifically its Ministry of Defence and the financial institution Zigama Credit and Savings Society, was placed under US sanctions due to its alleged support for the FRN and military interference in the internal affairs of the DRC.[15]
4. Sahel – Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger
In the area around the tri-border region between Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, the intensity of fighting between the terrorist groups Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) and Islamic State-Sahel province (ISSP) increased further. On 9 October, ISSP reportedly once again attacked positions held by JNIM fighters, this time in the border area between Burkina Faso and Mali. The main hotspot of the fighting was reportedly Oudalan province in Burkina Faso, while clashes spread to other areas in the following days, including the Gao region in Mali. The number of casualties has not been independently confirmed. Initial estimates suggest approximately 60 deaths on both sides combined, while on 12 October ISSP claimed that its fighters had killed more than 400 JNIM members. JNIM responded to the attacks by sending additional reinforcements, but there is no reliable information on subsequent fighting. Therefore, we cannot confirm a victor in the clashes. We can only establish that the fighting in the region is not over.2
The Malian army, with the support of the Russian Africa Corps, recaptured the town of Kidal in Mali’s northern desert region on 6 October. Government forces had withdrawn from Kidal almost half a year ago. The town was subsequently controlled by members of the rebel organisation Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), which is an ally of JNIM. Regaining control of it represents a major political victory for the government. A source within JNIM stated that the organisation’s objective is not to control territory, but rather to wage a war of attrition against the government. Since government forces did not inflict any serious losses on the rebels when capturing Kidal, as they took the town without a fight, the strategic significance of this achievement is diminished, as the fall of the town did not result in a serious reduction in the rebels’ capabilities.[16]
The rivalry and competition between ISSP and JNIM remain at their peak, as the two organisations are fighting over supply routes and the expansion of their overall influence. Both organisations are strengthening their presence around the border between Mali and Burkina Faso, while the October clashes confirm that the conflict has reached a new level of intensity.2
* Views and opinions of the authors of this paper do not necessarily correspond to the views of the Euro-Atlantic Council of Slovenia.
Sources
[1] News Desk. “OLA Captures Federal Police Personnel and Weapons in Major Finchaa Operation”. The Abay Times. (23 October 2026; updated 29 October 2026). https://abaytimes.com/conflict/ola-captures-federal-police-weapons-finchaa-operation
[2] Karr, L. & Ford, Y. “Ethiopia Reaches Eritrean Border; M23 Rebrands with Kabila: Africa File, October 15, 2026”. Critical Threats. (15 October 2026). https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/Ethiopia-eritrea-tigray-drc-m23-fln-kabila-rwanda-jnim-issp
[3] Europe External Programme with Africa (EEPA). “Situation Report – Horn of Africa, No. 769”. (12 October 2026). EEPA. https://www.eepa.be/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Situation-Report-EEPA-Horn-No.-769-12-October-2026.pdf
[4] TesfaNews. “Another Blow to Abiy Ahmed’s Forces”. X. (14 October 2026). https://x.com/tesfanews/status/2110464246609756446
[5] Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED). “Ethiopia Alerts Archive”. ACLED. https://acleddata.com/ethiopia-alerts-archive
[6] Security Council Report. “Sudan: Briefing and Consultations”. What’s in Blue. (15 October 2026). https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2026/10/sudan-briefing-and-consultations-14.php?print=true
[7] Sudan Tribune. “Sudanese Army Intensifies Airstrikes on RSF Positions in Darfur and Kordofan”. Sudan Tribune. (22 October 2026). https://sudantribune.com/article/320326
[8] Sudan Tribune. “RSF-SPLM-N Force Claims Advance Near Blue Nile Capital, Army Disputes Push”. Sudan Tribune. (4 October 2026). https://sudantribune.com/article/319587
[9] Sudan Tribune. “Sudanese Army Repels Joint RSF and SPLM-N Attack in Blue Nile Region”. Sudan Tribune. (20 October 2026). https://sudantribune.com/article/320207
[10] Sudan Tribune. “Sudanese Army Says It Repelled RSF, SPLM-N Assault in Blue Nile”. Sudan Tribune. (19 October 2026). https://sudantribune.com/article/320151
[11] Sudan Tribune. “Drone Strikes Hit Gold Mines, Facilities in Sudan’s Blue Nile”. Sudan Tribune. (29 October 2026). https://sudantribune.com/article/320620
[12] Al Jazeera Staff, AFP & AP. “Former DR Congo President Kabila Joins M23 Rebels in a New Coalition”. Al Jazeera. (13 October 2026). https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/10/13/former-dr-congo-president-kabila-joins-m23-rebels-in-a-new-coalition
[13] DeAngelo, M., Karr, L. & Wiebler, A. “Congo War Security Review”. Critical Threats. (8 October 2026). https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/congo-war-security-review/october-7-2026
[14] DeAngelo, M., Karr, L. & Wiebler, A. “Congo War Security Review”. Critical Threats. (22 October 2026). https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/congo-war-security-review/october-21-2026
[15] Ford, Y. & Wilder, H. “Congo War Security Review, October 28, 2026”. Critical Threats. (28 October 2026). https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/congo-war-security-review/october-28-2026
[16] Nasr, W. “What Kidal Portends: JNIM, Islamic State, and the Sahelian Security Landscape”. The Soufan Center. (28 October 2026). https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2026-october-28/

