Situation Room 2.0
Monthly Security Overview

The Middle East: Iran

Period: October 2026
Author: Miriam Medved
Region: Middle East

In October 2026, the Middle East remained tense as the US–Iran conflict continued, commercial vessels came under attack in the Strait of Hormuz, and fighting intensified in Yemen. Diplomatic efforts to ease tensions between Washington and Tehran made little progress, while the Houthis stepped up attacks on Saudi infrastructure alongside their ongoing battles with Yemeni government forces, putting shipping in the Red Sea at further risk. Meanwhile, the European Union established a support mission to strengthen Lebanon’s security institutions. In Israel, parliamentary elections left Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s bloc without a majority, opening the way for difficult coalition negotiations and an uncertain political future.

1.1 Military Tensions and Diplomatic Efforts

Diplomatic efforts to end the US–Iran conflict continued in October, with little tangible progress. Despite the threat of further military action, Washington and Tehran maintained indirect contact, primarily through Qatar and Pakistan. Negotiations remained stalled over the terms of a potential agreement, particularly the lifting of the US naval blockade and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.[1]

On 26 October, Saudi Defence Minister Khalid bin Salman, Pakistan’s army chief Asim Munir and Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin travelled to Tehran for talks aimed at easing regional tensions and preventing the conflict from spreading. The meeting produced no agreement but signalled a more active diplomatic role for countries whose security and economic interests were directly at stake.[2]

Qatar stepped up its mediation efforts towards the end of the month. On 31 October, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi confirmed that Tehran had reviewed a letter from US Vice President JD Vance and described Washington’s proposal for dialogue as a positive step. He nevertheless ruled out the need for direct talks with US officials. That same day, the Iranian Chief of the General Staff Ali Abdollahi warned of a large-scale military response to renewed attacks, while US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that Washington had yet to decide whether to resume major military operations.[3]

The diplomatic exchanges kept the possibility of negotiations open but did little to narrow the differences between the two sides. The growing involvement of regional powers reflected their concern that a wider military confrontation would threaten both their security and economic interests.

1.2 The Strait of Hormuz and Maritime Security

Attacks on commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and surrounding waters continued throughout October. Lloyd’s List Intelligence recorded at least 28 attacks or security incidents in the first half of the month, the highest number since the outbreak of the US–Iran war. The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) warned that some shipping companies were failing to report attacks, making the full scale of the threat difficult to assess.[4]

Two Singapore-flagged container ships were struck while transiting the strait on 13 and 14 October. The GFS Pride caught fire and subsequently sank, while the GFS Giselle reached a safe anchorage despite sustaining damage. All 43 crew members were rescued, with no injuries reported. Attacks continued later in the month. The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) recorded damage to the tanker RITI on 29 October, while UKMTO reported further strikes on commercial vessels the following day. Shipping through the strait nevertheless continued, albeit at reduced levels. According to Lloyd’s List Intelligence, 104 vessels without Iranian affiliations transited the waterway between 5 and 11 October, down 17% from the previous week. Shipping operators adjusted their transport arrangements to manage the risks, while some oil shipments relied on additional tankers and ship-to-ship cargo transfers.[5] [6]

The continued movement of vessels should not be mistaken for a return to normal conditions. Attacks and uncertainty over shipping security drove up transport and insurance costs and complicated energy supplies. The Strait of Hormuz remained a major source of pressure in the confrontation between Washington and Tehran.

2. Escalation of the War in Yemen and Attacks on Saudi Arabia

2.1 Military Operations and Territorial Developments

Fighting intensified across Yemen in October 2026, particularly along the western coast and around Taiz. Following Houthi advances in September, Yemen’s internationally recognised government launched a Saudi-backed counteroffensive, Operation Dawn of Yemen, on 5 October. Government forces claimed to have recaptured strategic positions near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, including the Dubab area and the port city of Mokha. The Houthis denied losing Mokha, while independent reports confirmed only limited gains by government forces.[7]

Meanwhile, Houthi forces increased pressure on Taiz, capturing the town of Turbah on 4 October and threatening a key supply route linking the city to Aden. By mid-October, the main access roads into Taiz had been closed. The National reported on 14 October that approximately 800,000 residents had been cut off from surrounding areas, while food prices had risen by more than 50% since the fighting escalated.[8]

Fighting also continued around the Kahbub mountains, a strategic position overlooking transport routes towards the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Supported by Saudi air strikes, government forces conducted operations on other fronts, particularly in Marib and Al Jawf provinces. Their initial gains fell short of a decisive breakthrough, and the Houthis retained the capacity to advance towards Taiz.[9]

The October fighting demonstrated that control of transport and supply routes mattered as much as territorial gains. Disrupting these routes placed further pressure on government-held positions and worsened an already difficult humanitarian situation.

2.2 Houthi Attacks on Saudi Arabia and Threats to Red Sea Shipping

Houthi missile and drone attacks on Saudi Arabia intensified in October 2026, with airports and energy infrastructure among the principal targets. The deadliest attack struck King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh on 10 October, killing 13 people and injuring more than 300, according to Saudi authorities. The airport was temporarily closed, forcing numerous flight cancellations and diversions.[10]

The attacks extended to eastern Saudi Arabia. An administrative facility belonging to Saudi Aramco in Dhahran was targeted on 13 October, followed by an attack on King Fahd International Airport in Dammam on 21 October. Saudi authorities reported two deaths and eight injuries in the latter incident. Towards the end of the month, the Houthis threatened further strikes against Saudi refineries and airports, although their claims of successful attacks could not be independently verified.[11]

Maritime security in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait also remained precarious. The Houthi presence along Yemen’s western coast continued to pose a threat to international commercial shipping. On 30 October, the Norwegian Maritime Authority maintained its highest security level, Level 3, for the Bab el-Mandeb area, with Level 2 remaining in effect across the wider Red Sea. Under the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, Level 2 requires additional protective measures in response to heightened security risks, while Level 3 applies when an attack is considered probable or imminent. In practice, these designations require ships to strengthen onboard security, assess risks before entering affected waters and follow relevant security procedures. They do not automatically prohibit passage, but can affect route planning and decisions on whether to transit high-risk areas.[12]

By striking Saudi infrastructure and threatening shipping routes, the Houthis increased pressure on Riyadh while disrupting regional trade. Their ability to conduct operations beyond Yemen’s immediate battlefields continued to contribute to regional instability.

3. The European Union and the Security Situation in Lebanon

On 12 October 2026, the Council of the European Union established the EU Support Mission in Lebanon (EUSM Lebanon) to strengthen the country’s defence and security institutions. Under an initial three-year mandate, the mission will provide advice and training to the Lebanese Armed Forces and Internal Security Forces as part of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy. Its areas of responsibility include border control, maritime security, counter-smuggling operations and port security.[13]

The decision came amid uncertainty over the future of the international security presence in southern Lebanon, where Israel’s military presence and the disarmament of Hezbollah remain unresolved. EUSM Lebanon is not intended to replace the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Its mandate is primarily advisory, with an emphasis on strengthening Lebanese institutions. Initial activities are planned north of the Litani River, while any expansion southwards will depend on political and security conditions and the consent of the Lebanese government.[14]

The Council’s October decision established the mission’s legal framework but did not authorise the start of operational activities. The initiative represents an effort to strengthen Lebanon’s capacity to manage its own security, although it cannot, on its own, resolve the underlying causes of instability in the south. Its effectiveness will also depend on subsequent political and security arrangements.

4. Parliamentary Elections in Israel

Israel’s parliamentary elections on 27 October 2026 left neither of the main political blocs with a majority in the 120-seat Knesset. Final results published on 30 October gave Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s bloc 53 seats and the opposition bloc led by Gadi Eisenkot 48. Two Arab electoral lists secured a combined 19 seats, placing them in a potentially decisive position in negotiations over the next government.[15]

Likud remained the largest individual party with 27 seats, but Netanyahu’s bloc lost its parliamentary majority. The opposition could reach the 61 seats needed to form a government with support from the Arab parties, although political differences made such an arrangement difficult. The election weakened Netanyahu’s position without giving the opposition a clear route to power. The outcome of coalition negotiations will determine the country’s next political direction.[16]

* Views and opinions of the authors of this paper do not necessarily correspond to the views of the Euro-Atlantic Council of Slovenia.


Sources

[1]Ghanem, V., & Harisi, M. A. (8 October 2026). Diplomacy or war? US-Iran deadlock reaches fork in the road. The National. https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2026/10/08/attempt-to-break-us-iran-diplomatic-deadlock-up-against-growing-appetite-for-major-war/

[2] Mills, A., Shahid, A., & AlaaElDin, M. (26 October 2026). Saudi defence pact countries push for peace in Tehran as Houthis launch more attacks. Reuters. https://uk.marketscreener.com/news/top-officials-from-mecca-pact-countries-to-meet-iranian-officials-in-tehran-on-monday-two-sources-s-ce785cdfd08df723

[3] Al Jazeera Staff. (31 October 2026). Iran FM says US outreach a ‘positive step’ as delegation in Qatar for talks. Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/10/31/iran-fm-says-us-outreach-a-positive-step-as-delegation-in-qatar-for-talks

[4] Maritime Intelligence Unit. (22 October 2026). Strait of Hormuz brief: 22 October, 2026. Lloyd’s List Intelligence. https://www.lloydslistintelligence.com/resources/blog/strait-of-hormuz-brief-22-october-2026

[5] Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore. (14 October 2026). Two Singapore-registered vessels struck in Strait of Hormuz. https://www.mpa.gov.sg/media-centre/details/two-singapore-registered-vessels-struck-in-strait-of-hormuz

[6] International Maritime Organization. (n.d.). Middle East – Highlighted (confirmed) incidents. https://www.imo.org/en/mediacentre/hottopics/pages/middle-east-highlighted-incidents.aspx

[7] Al Jazeera Staff, Associated Press, & Reuters. (6 October 2026). Yemen forces claim key gains near Bab al-Mandeb: What’s the latest? Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/10/6/yemen-war-whats-the-latest-on-the-battlefield

[8] AlTaher, N. (14 October 2026). Under siege: Taiz isolated and afraid as Houthis and Yemeni forces fight over city. The National. https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2026/10/14/under-siege-taiz-isolated-and-afraid-as-houthis-and-yemeni-forces-fight-over-city/

[9] Al-Shamahi, A. (6 October 2026). Yemen’s government is on the attack against the Houthis. What has changed? Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news-analysis/2026/10/6/yemen-government-is-on-the-attack-against-the-houthis-what-has-changed

[10] Al Jazeera Staff, Agence France-Presse, & Associated Press. (11 October 2026). Yemen fighting expands as Houthis attack Saudi airport again: What to know. Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/10/11/yemen-fighting-expands-as-houthis-attack-saudi-airport-what-to-know

[11] Anwer, B. (22 October 2026). 1 person killed in attack on eastern Saudi airport, authorities say. Associated Press. https://apnews.com/article/riyadh-saudi-arabia-oil-facility-drones-01c03af3191263452376510a670e8bf7

[12] Norwegian Maritime Authority. (30 October 2026). The Southern Red Sea, Bab el Mandeb and the northern Gulf of Aden. https://www.sdir.no/en/accidents-and-safety/maritim-sikring/security-level-for-norwegian-vessels/gulf-of-aden-bab-el-mandeb-red-sea

[13] Council of the European Union. (12 October 2026). Lebanon: EU establishes new CSDP support mission to strengthen defence and security institutions. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/10/12/lebanon-eu-establishes-new-csdp-support-mission-to-strengthen-defence-and-security-institutions/

[14] Council of the European Union. (12 October 2026). Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/2296 on a European Union Support mission in Lebanon (EUSM Lebanon). Official Journal of the European Union. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32026D2296

[15] The Times of Israel. (30 October 2026). Central Elections Committee publishes final election results, Knesset to be sworn in Nov. 10. The Times of Israel. https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/central-elections-committee-publishes-final-election-results-knesset-to-be-sworn-in-nov-10/

[16] Anna, C., & Hazboun, I. (30 October 2026). Difficult negotiations lie ahead in Israel after Netanyahu’s bloc lost its parliamentary majority. Associated Press. https://apnews.com/article/israel-elections-netanyahu-results-eisenkot-arabs-3a793c0d07fdfe515390524b849d8674