Situation Room 2.0
Monthly Security Overview

Eastern Europe

Period: April 2026
Author: Erik Nalić
Region: Eastern Europe

Due to US preoccupation with the war with Iran, the Ukraine-Russia peace talks have stalled, a situation made worse by the resignation of the US ambassador to Ukraine. Russian and Ukraine agreed to a 32-hour mutual ceasefire for Orthodox Easter despite both sides increasing drone attacks over the course of the month. For the first time since 2007, the Victory Day parade in Moscow would not feature any military vehicles. The Baltic states have denied responsibility for Ukrainian drones flying over their airspace that attacked Russia. This month the greatest changes occurred in Hungary, following the election victory of Peter Magyar. The EU was able to approve a €90 billion package for Ukraine, although at the same time the Druzhba oil pipeline from Russia to Hungary reopened following repairs. In a surprise move, Moldova withdrew its membership in the Russia-led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

1. Ukraine-Russia conflict

Peace talks between Ukraine and Russia stalled in late March and early April. The reasons reported by the media vary, some say that the main reason is the war between the US and Iran, which led to the US temporarily suspending mediation of the talks, while others report that the stall occurred earlier due to disagreements between the two countries[1]. On 18 April  Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reported at a diplomatic forum in Anatolia that peace talks with Ukraine are not Russia’s top priority and sees no reason to continue them.[2] The current diplomatic situation between the US and Ukraine is said to have deteriorated, and on 28 April US Ambassador to Ukraine Julie Davis announced that she would resign in June. The reason for this is said to be the current US administration’s lack of support for Ukraine. US State Department spokesman Tommy Pigott denied her allegation, although her predecessor, Bridget Brink, resigned last April citing similar reasons.[3]

A 32-hour ceasefire was agreed between the two sides for the Orthodox Easter holiday, from 4pm on Saturday, 12 April to the end of Sunday, 13 April.[4] Despite the ceasefire, both sides recorded significant infringements during the 32 hours. Ukraine recorded 2,299 ceasefire violations while Russia recorded 1,971, with both sides accusing the other of violations.[5] As of 19 April, according to the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), the most attacks on Ukrainian cities were carried out by Russian Shahed-136/131 drones. In April, there were 4,464 such attacks, which is almost 1,200) more cases than in March for the same period and almost 3,000 more cases than a year earlier.[6] This data may be related to a shift in the production of military equipment in Russia, which prioritises the production of drones, as reported in early 2025, with plans to build 48 new factories by 2035, specifically for the production of unmanned systems.[7] According to data for March, Ukraine overtook Russia in the their use for the first time during the conflict, with 7,347 recorded cases, while the Russians used 6,462, which could signal a change in the balance of power between[8], and also indicates increased cooperation with European countries regarding their production, as earlier this year Ukraine signed a large number of agreements for the production and development of drones with EU countries (Latvia, Denmark, Finland, Poland).[9] Ukraine has attacked numerous ports and oil refineries using long-range drones, which, according to data from late March, temporarily limited Russian oil exports by as much as 40%.[10] For the first time since 2007, Russia announced it would not include any military vehicles in the Victory Day parade in Moscow due to the threat of Ukrainian attacks.[11] Some other sources have hinted that the reason could be  a shortage of such equipment due to the ongoing war in Ukraine.[12]

2. Eastern Europe

Ukrainian drone attacks in late March used Baltic airspace to attack Russian ports of Primorsk and Ust-Luga. Some of these drones also crashed inside Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as well as in Finland. The Baltic states have demanded a clear explanation from Ukraine why they used their airspace, saying such actions further strain relations with Russia. They have also denied any cooperation or approval for the use of their airspace. Russia has used these events to exert propaganda pressure on the Baltic states. Such developments could trigger a spillover of the war beyond Ukrainian territory. Nevertheless, the Baltic states continue to show support for Ukraine, as evidenced by the agreement between Ukraine and Estonia on 25 April for mutual cooperation between the two defence industries.[13] And the joint statements of all three countries on the social network X on 10 April.[14]

Source: AP/Darko Bandic (illustrative image)

After the election victory of Peter Magyar in Hungary, the EU finally approved a €90 billion package for Ukraine, overturning the Hungarian veto.[15] The change of power gives the EU a freer path to provide aid to Ukraine and limits Russian influence within the EU. Upon his victory, Magyar promised to try and repair relations with NATO and the EU with the aim of building a more cohesive alliance.[16] At the same time, the Druzhba oil pipeline, which had been one of the main reasons for the disputes between Ukraine and Hungary in recent months, was re-opened on 22 April  after a long delay following repairs. Despite this apparent split in interests, the incoming Hungarian PM expressed greater support for Ukraine.[17]

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said on 27 April that he had reached an agreement to increase cooperation in the field of unmanned systems with Ukraine. The latter is to help Poland build a “modern drone armada” to protect its airspace from Russian drone incursions. The project is to be implemented with the help of European defence funds. This agreement demonstrates more than just one-sided cooperation with Ukraine, and that other NATO and EU member states are also learning from the experience gained by Ukrainians through the conflict.[18]

Moldova’s parliament has voted to withdraw from the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The parliament is reported to have decided on 2 April to sever ties with the Russian-led organisation, which was formed in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The process of departure takes 12 months after the announcement of the withdrawal. This is a significant event for Moldova, signalling a significant move towards EU integration.[19]

* Views and opinions of the authors of this paper do not necessarily correspond to the views of the Euro-Atlantic Council of Slovenia.


Sources

[1] Teslova E. (1. 4. 2026). Russia says it ‘firmly seized initiative’ in Ukraine, peace talks on pause. AA. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukraine-war/russia-says-it-firmly-seized-initiative-in-ukraine-peace-talks-on-pause/3887921

[2] Zadorozhnyy T. (18. 4. 2026). Russia in no rush to resume Ukraine peace talks, Lavrov says. Kyiv independent.https://kyivindependent.com/russia-in-no-rush-to-resume-ukraine-peace-talks-lavrov-says/

[3] Miller C., Mackinnon A. (28. 4. 2026). US ambassador to Ukraine to leave over differences with Donald Trump. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/33d5d8d4-a7db-4647-9751-c21de8ebecb8?syn-25a6b1a6=1

[4] Butenko V., Tarasova-Markina D. (11. 4. 2026). Russia’s Putin declares ceasefire with Ukraine for Orthodox Easter. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2026/04/10/europe/russia-putin-easter-ceasefire-intl

[5] Phillips A., Shevchenko V. (12. 4. 2026). Ukraine and Russia accuse each other of hundreds of ceasefire violations. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cz78y73v830o

[6] CSIS (28. 4. 2026). Russian Firepower Strike Tracker: Analyzing Missile Attacks in Ukraine. CSIS. https://www.csis.org/programs/futures-lab/projects/russian-firepower-strike-tracker-analyzing-missile-attacks-ukraine

[7] DuPont I., Vranian B., Powers B. (februar 2026). Red Skies Ahead Russia Planning for Its Drone-Driven Army of Tomorrow. Army University Press. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2026/Red-Skies-Ahead/

[8] UNN (7. 4. 2026). Ukraine for the first time surpassed Russia in the number of attack drone launches per month – ABC News. UNN. https://unn.ua/en/news/ukraine-for-the-first-time-surpassed-russia-in-the-number-of-attack-drone-launches-per-month-abc-news

[9] Odessa-journal (26 February 2026). 4 Ukrainian nanufacturers signs €800M defense tech deals with Denmark, Finland, Latvia. Odessa-journal. https://odessa-journal.com/4-ukrainian-nanufacturers-signs-800m-defense-tech-deals-with-denmark-finland-latvia

[10] Revishvili G. (20. 4. 2026). Russia threatens Europe as Ukraine escalates strikes on Putin’s oil industry. Atkabtuc Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/russia-threatens-europe-as-ukraine-escalates-strikes-on-putins-oil-industry/

[11] Lukiv J. (29. 4. 2026). Russia scales back Moscow Victory Day parade, blaming threat from Ukraine. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c794wp4yy93o

[12] Melkozerova V. (29. 4. 2026). Putin scales back Red Square military parade amid Ukraine war struggles. Politico. https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-scales-down-may-9-military-parade-amid-ukraine-war-struggles/

[13] Chmielewski B. (27. 4. 2026). Estonia: assessments of the Russian threat cause friction between Tallinn and Kyiv. OSW. https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2026-04-27/estonia-assessments-russian-threat-cause-friction-between-tallinn

[14] Wright H. (11. 4. 2026). ‘Baseless:’ Baltics deny Ukraine is using their airspace to attack Russia. TVP WORLD. https://tvpworld.com/92579693/baltics-blast-baseless-russian-disinformation-campaign

[15] Liboreiro J. (23. 4. 2026). EU approves €90 billion loan for Ukraine after Hungary lifts controversial veto. Euro news. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2026/04/23/eu-approves-90-billion-loan-for-ukraine-after-hungary-lifts-controversial-veto

[16] Fix L. (13. 4. 2026). Orbán’s Fall in Hungary Opens a Door for Europe — and Closes One for Russia. Counciul on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/articles/orbans-fall-in-hungary-opens-a-door-for-europe-and-closes-one-for-russia

[17] Reuters (22. 4. 2026). Druzhba pipeline restarts Russian oil flows to Europe, unblocking $105B EU loan for Kyiv. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2026/04/22/europe/druzhba-ukraine-pipeline-restarts-intl

[18] Tilles D. (27. 4. 2026). Poland announces plans for “drone armada” to be developed with Ukrainian expertise. Notes from Poland. https://notesfrompoland.com/2026/04/27/poland-announces-plans-for-drone-armada-to-be-developed-with-ukrainian-expertise/

[19] Fornusek M. (2. 4. 2026). Moldova’s parliament approves exit from Russia-led CIS. The Kyiv Independent. https://kyivindependent.com/moldovas-parliament-backs-exit-from-russian-led-cis/